No NATO nostalgia for global security 

New Challenges Need New Answers

American Council on Germany, New York, 25.06.15

Dear Juliane Camfield
Dear Steven Sokol
Dear Consul Wagener,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for the kind introduction and thank
you all for coming.

1 Europe Then and Now

‘Whole, free and at peace’ – that was the vision U.S. President George H. W. Bush laid out for Europe in 1989. And for a time it looked like we came very close to its realization. In the European Security Strategy of 2003 it still said: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.” Since then, that perception has changed drastically. Today, the world has gotten “more connected, more contested and more complex”. Or to quote our Foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier. “The World has come loose from its Moorings.”

That is why the European Union tasked High Representative Federica Mogherini with drafting a new European Security Strategy (ESS). The new Strategy seeks to address recent changes in the security environment.

2 New Security Challenges

Of the security challenges we face today some really are new, others are merely new on our radar. I will focus on four particularly pressing issues – while the actual list unfortunately is much longer. And then discuss their consequences for transatlantic security cooperation:
 Fragility
 Growing Inequality
 Climate change
 Energy Security

2.1 Fragility Won’t Go Away

The EU strives to be surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’ – which is the lofty goal of its Neighborhood Policy. But the grim reality is a ring of instability all around Europe – from frozen conflict to civil war, from the Ukraine, to Libya,
Syria, and Iraq. The commonality of all these cases lays in these countries’ fragility. This is to say they lack the will or capacity to provide basic state functions such as
 security,
 rule of law and
 welfare

It is the absence of good governance. In the resulting vacuum organized crime, militias, and war lords take over. Extremism is being fostered. These fragile states pose a regional, sometimes international security threat. And if we like it or not – it’s a permanent phenomenon. So we have to learn to deal with areas of limited statehood. This includes questioning our own intervention policies which despite best intentions sometimes breed further instability – as Europe sees in Libya. The FrenchBritish (US-) intervention increased the fragility not only in Libya but in all of northern Africa.

2.2 Growing inequality

This year, we reach a sad record:
 1 per cent of the world’s population will own more than the remaining 99
 Two billion people live on less than 2 $ a day
 One billion has no access to clean water
 Another two billion are excluded from modern energy sources.

The growing inequality and related poverty fuel conflict and constitute security risks. High unemployment rates have contributed to the Arab rebellions, corruption has spurred the fall of Yanukovych and hopelessness fuels the conflict in Gaza.

To meet the challenge of growing inequality, we need sustainable investments. We need trade that’s not only free, but fair. When designing a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement for instance, the repercussions of such an agreement on developing countries need to be taken into account – not brushed aside as it is happening in the current negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

2.3 Climate Change is a Security Risk

Climate change is not just an issue for environmentalists. Global warming has real security implications. This insight has proven to be a tough sell in the security community, but the tide might be turning:

The U.S. Department of Defense first listed climate change as a threat to national security in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. In 2014 it published a Climate Change Adaptation Road Map. Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel correctly pointed out that “rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea levels and more extreme weather events will intensify the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict.”

His prognosis went on, these developments “will likely lead to food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe.”

In short, the changing climate puts additional stress on already fragile regions
and threatens to destabilize formerly stable ones. To give an example, the conflict in Syria is the product of a variety of factors – among them a weather-related phenomenon. From 2007 to 2010, intense drought forced large numbers of the rural population into the cities exacerbating pre-existing tensions. Especially considering the Iraqi refugees who had already flocked there. Syria was particularly vulnerable to the effects of the drought because agriculture and water had been managed poorly by the government. Upon this hotbed the crisis spread.

Recently, the G7 has caught on to the issue. The foreign ministers of seven major economies commissioned a study on climate and fragility risks. Its results were presented at this year’s meeting of the G7 foreign ministers in Lübeck, Germany. The report, titled “A New Climate for Peace”, urges states both individually and in unison to increase their resilience towards the effects of climate change. This requires foresight and commitment – qualities one begins to doubt given the short attention span of the G7.

In April, the security implications of climate change were highlighted at the foreign ministers’ meeting. Two months later, they still did not make it into the G7 summit’s final declaration.The same skepticism applies to the climate
goals that did make the list in Elmau. The G7 member states currently counteract goals like the two-degreetarget with their national energy policies. Best or better worst example was the president of the G7-Summit, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel. On Monday she promised a Zero Emissions Energy Strategy for 2050. On Friday she stopped a new Climate Fee that would have helped to phase out very old lignite fired power plants – the most harmful German emitters to climate. Now Germany will most likely fail to reach its own goals for 2020. Wording and doing are not always two sides of Merkel’s Coin.

2.4 Energy Security

Which brings us the issue of energy security and energy foreign policy. Dependencies on fossil fuel pose serious security challenges. The conflict in Ukraine is the latest manifestation of the ways in which these dependencies influence foreign policy.
 A gas war between Ukraine and Russia has turned into a hybrid war over spheres of influence and energy resources.
 The EU – and Germany in particular – is highly dependent on Russian gas, which runs through Ukraine: 86 % of Germany’s  gas needs are covered by imports, with 40 % coming from Russia alone.
 Russia, in turn, relies on Europe’s money and to an even greater extent on petrodollars.Russia’s budget for 2015 is based on an oil price of $105 (Brent). That is pretty shaky ground considering oil prices are dropping and have barely surpassed $60 this year.

The conflict in Ukraine has revealed the dilemma of European energy foreign policy: Russia remains the backbone of European energy supply – at least in the medium term. For the moment, the two are interdependent. However, unlike Russia with its non-diversified economy, the European Union has the option of reducing its dependence. Consequently, the EU is in the process of forging an Energy Union with the aim of diversifying its fossil energy sources. To do so, the Union will place its trust in countries such as Qatar and Azerbaijan. Real energy-independence looks different. Ultimately, we will have to get out of fossil energy altogether – by massively increasing renewables, enhancing energy efficiency and energy saving.

3 Old Reflexes

These quote-unquote new challenges are interdependent and exacerbate each other. They require a coherent approach instead of the unfortunate mixture of reactive, short-sighted piecemeal and symbolic politics that characterizes
today’s crisis management. Some of the challenges like climate change are pushed to the margins because they are falsely being perceived as less acute. They are occasionally paraded around at summit meetings – with little lasting effect. Those challenges whose acuteness cannot be denied – the threat of extremism and the conflict in Ukraine for example – are dealt with in rash style.

We are constantly taken by surprise by the next major crisis. This can be blamed on a failure of early warning systems and a lack of strategic vision. That lack has become painfully obvious in the international response to the crisis in Ukraine. The Russian annexation of Crimea has triggered a lot of old reflexes. These days, nostalgia abounds in NATO. Policy proposals are taken straight from the Cold War playbook. Both sides are sending alarming signals.
 The New York Times reports U.S. plans to station heavy weaponry in Eastern Europe
 tit-for-tat – Putin announces his intention to acquire 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles to add to Russia’s nuclear stockpile.
 Reckless behavior like this threatens to lead to a new arms race.

3.1 Transatlantic Relations

The crisis in Ukraine spurs inner European and – more – Transatlantic disagreement. Different geographic proximity and economic ties result in different stakes. Consequently, the assessment of the conflict diverges and with it the assessment of how to respond.

The search for a solution has revealed a competition between EU mechanisms and NATO. For the moment, the balance has tipped in NATO’s favor. The discourse is dominated by calls for arms build-up against a Russian threat. 59 per cent of Americans think the EU is not tough enough in dealing with Russia on the issue of Ukraine, while a clear majority of Germans reject a tougher policy.

Though, Cold War nostalgia tends to muddy the facts. Our collective defense works. The EU alone spends more than 2.5 times as much on defense as Russia. There is no gap to close. Despite the bellicose rhetoric, the fact remains:
 this conflict cannot be solved militarily. The provisions of the Minsk 2 agreement need to be fulfilled.
 And at the same time, we need to keep the channels open. It’s high time to reinstate the NATO-Russia-Council. Communication is key.
 The current estrangement is not in our interest. None of today’s most pressing
challenges like the fight against IS, averting national bankruptcy in Ukraine or realizing a world trade that’s fair can be tackled without or against Russia (or China for that matter).

4 New Answers

What the nostalgics tend to ignore is this:
 While we are prepared to defend ourselves against traditional threats, we are ill equipped to deal with new challenges.
 Climate change, growing inequality, energy dependencies and fragile states pose real threats to our security and we have no answers beyond the Cold War tool box.
 Ukraine for instance resembles the failing,states phenomena we witness in Northern Africa and the Middle East more closely than any Cold War scenario. It’s a modern challenge and NATO with its backward turn is out of its depth.
 In dealing with fragile states we will need more policeman than tanks, more doctors, economists, engineers, judges and attorneys. To help foster stability, we need a stronger EU and a stronger UN.

4.1 Stronger Common European Foreign and Security Policy

For the EU this means strengthening its common foreign and security policy. That includes deepened cooperation and more robust elements. And patience. We need to be realistic about the time frame for further integration. The task at hand is to overcome the dramatic underfunding of our missions. Only 10% of a
mission like the one in the Central African Republic come out of the regular budget. The remaining 90 % depend on voluntary donations. For years Europa has had its Battle Groups – but never deployed them for mostly national reasons. That is the real homework Europe has to do.

4.2 Stronger UN

In the meantime, the transatlantic partners should send a clear signal for a stronger UN. At 70, the world organization is getting bad rap. There is a growing trend towards the circumvention of the UN Security Council on the account of its need for reform. While mounting crises are amplifying each other, we are losing
the ability to solve these conflicts within institutional frameworks. Beyond the necessary reforms, we should stop actively undermining the UN’s legitimacy.
 The coalition against IS is currently a Coalition of the Willing.
 For the past few weeks, the Security Council has been debating a resolution to
destroy smuggler vessels in the Mediterranean. It might not pass. It might not
matter – Mogherini has already presented a UN mandate as optional.

Europe is on a dangerous path – away from international law. While the number of UN peace-keeping missions has gone up, EU participation has gone down. European states currently have 6000 soldiers deployed which make up a meager 7 % of the 90.000 UN peacekeepers worldwide, not counting the 12.500 police forces that complete these missions of which merely 20 are German. In view of the new security challenges we need more transatlantic engagement in civil military missions. This will require a policy shift, different equipment and different training.

5 Conclusion: We’ll Need to Get Creative

There is no need to be nostalgic about the old days: new, compound risks ensure that there’s plenty of security cooperation ahead. So far, debates about adequate responses have been divisive when they should unite the transatlantic
partners. They are common challenges, after all. We’ll need to get creative and jointly forge a forward-looking and coherent strategy.

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